Summary
Introduction
A 2006 article, co-authored by two of the present authors, provided a preliminary empirical assessment of the Rehnquist Court's decisions on federal preemption. 1 This article, covering the election, meanwhile, seemed to point in the opposite, anti-preemption direction. Under President Bush, agencies often took a firm position in favor of preemption. President Obama, in contrast, instructed government agencies to strike preemption language from their regulations (barring "full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and … a sufficient legal basis") 21 and, moreover, to examine a decade's worth of regulations for unwarranted preemption language. 22 That change, coupled with a number of Supreme Court rulings against federal rather than true preemption cases. In such cases, the preemptive force of the federal enactment is not at issue; the question, rather, is the substantive reach of the statute.
preemption, suggested that "[t]he preemption winds have shifted" 23 in a more state-friendly direction.
PRC articulated our misgivings about understanding preemption cases along a single "attitudinal," ideological dimension. 24 Judicial "attitudes" for or against business are one dimension of preemption cases, and as explained in a moment, we have sought in this study to capture that dimension more accurately than we did in PRC. But they are only one dimension, and our examination of the Roberts Court provides further grounds for resisting any facile attitudinalism in the preemption domain. To break the suspense: our analysis of preemption decisions supports the perception of a distinctly business-friendly Roberts Court-but only up to a point, and for (we believe) surprising reasons. proved analytically useful there; we have maintained it here because the periods are sufficiently similar in length and case volume to permit comparisons.
B. Scope of the Study
Our initial study was prompted by misgivings about the reliability of extant data sets for purposes of examining statutory preemption, and it explained why and how we generated our data set "from scratch." 26 We have followed the same methodology and coding procedures here, with very minor exceptions 27 and with one important qualification: the categorization of cases as involving the preemption of "torts." The principal reason for this change, already alluded to, is to capture more closely the interest group dimension of preemption cases. The point, the procedures, and the results are described in Section II.D. below. 27 A few cases were re-coded with respect to "subject-matter." The changes are too minor to affect any of the results reported here.
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Section II provides an overview of preemption cases and outcomes. Section III examines the role of the litigating parties and of the Supreme Court's review of lower (state or federal court) decisions. Section IV discusses the role of the Solicitor General. Section V examines the Roberts Court and, in particular, the voting pattern of the individual justices. As already suggested, the findings of this study are broadly consistent with the results and tentative conclusions presented in PRC. Differences that have prompted us to modify our earlier analysis are discussed in the text. Section VI concludes.
II. Cases and Outcomes
A. Case Volume Figure 1 shows the distribution and the trendline. 
C. Conflict and Consensus; Outcomes
We divided preemption case outcome into "consensual" (unanimous, or a vote differential of four or above) and "conflictual" (vote differential of three or below). The updated resultsweighted to account for decisions with multiple preemption holdings 30 -are shown below (Table   2 ). The numbers for the Roberts Court suggest two noteworthy shifts. The second change has to do with preemption outcomes. On both Rehnquist Courts, propreemption holdings were a 50:50 proposition in consensual cases and a smidgen higher in contested cases. Not so on the Roberts Court, as shown in Table 3 . The widespread impression that the Roberts Court is more "business friendly" (or in any event preemption-friendly) than its predecessors appears to be correct. Somewhat perplexingly, however, contested cases are no more likely to produce pro-preemption outcomes than they were under the Rehnquist Courts. The pro-preemption trend has unfolded in cases without (much) dissent: in such cases, the Roberts Court has ruled for preemption with unusual frequency. 32 The difference between the combined Rehnquist Courts and the Roberts Court is large, and statistically significant at the 5% level. Section V examines the pattern in greater detail. 31 We have tested most of our results for statistical significance through ordinary methods (using robust standard errors) . We report partial results but, in the interest of parsimony, do not show the calculations; they are available upon request. 
D. Torts
PRC noted that the preemption of state common law and especially torts (as opposed to state statutes or regulations) had become a particularly contentious issue among scholars and among the justices. Accordingly, PRC distinguished and compared "tort" and "non-tort" (or "regulatory") preemption cases. 33 The key finding was that tort cases were more likely than regulatory case to generate pro-preemption outcomes. Upon examination, however, that supposed result turned out to be a by-product of a (statistically significant) party effect. 34 Antipreemption rulings are substantially more likely in cases to which a state is a party than in cases among private parties-and practically all tort cases fit the latter description.
The present study revisits and slightly revamps the "torts" analysis, for two reasons. First, tort cases have assumed ever-greater prominence in terms of raw numbers. Table 4 shows the distribution of tort cases for the four subject-matter categories (which compromise all but seven tort cases) and "All Other" cases. Second, "tort preemption" cases are ideologically contentious, in a way in which most regulatory preemption cases are not. They pit business directly against the plaintiffs' bar, in a continuous stream of zero-sum conflicts-quite often, over what looks like all the marbles. 35 The suspicion arises, then, that especially on an ideologically divided Court, tort preemption cases might differ meaningfully from more "states' rights-ish" cases; and that any differences in outcomes may have more to do with the justices' predispositions vis-à-vis business and the plaintiffs' bar than with preemption doctrine, statutory interpretation canons, or federalism intuitions.
More specifically (and polemically): the Supreme Court's (and especially the Roberts Court's) restrictive approach to class action certification, 36 pleading requirements, 37 and related questions 38 has prompted many observers to surmise, or allege, that the Court-or at any rate its 35 In one sense, the cases are over all the marbles: Congress practically never overrides statutory preemption decisions. Note, 120 Harv. L. Rev. at 1612 ("Congress almost never overrides the Supreme Court's preemption decisions"). To all intents, then, the Supreme Court's word on preemption is final. In a different perspective, preemption litigation in fields such as pharmaceutical regulation, securities regulation, and ERISA is a game of inches, one case and claim at a time. Preemption outcomes in these domains are highly path-dependent, a point that should be kept in mind in assessing the statistical results. See text p. 14, infra. conservative majority-"has it in" for the plaintiffs' bar. 39 "Tort preemption" cases may partake of that broader pattern: the Court may be anti-plaintiff rather (or more) than pro-business.
To examine these possibilities, we (re)-classified as a "Torts" case any case in which (1) a private plaintiff (2) seeks monetary relief and (3) the cause of action does not arise from a written instrument, such as an employee benefit plan. 40 Is there a distinctive, ideologically driven "tort preemption" pattern? Table 5 below provides a first, inconclusive impression. Unquestionably, tort preemption cases have become more contested (left-hand columns). As already suggested, however, that is true of all preemption cases. The differences are much more pronounced across time and Courts than they are between tort and regulatory cases. The probability of preemption (right-hand columns) looks largely random. The likelihood of tort preemption has increased from one Court to the next. Surely the most striking observation, though, is the Roberts Court's outlier status on the Non-Tort, Regulatory side. Ideological divisions are bound to surface most clearly in contested cases. 40 The parameters differ somewhat from those utilized in PRC. For details and explanation see Appendix B.
13 While the numbers here get uncomfortably small, the substantially higher rate of pro-preemption outcomes appears to support the "anti-plaintiffs'-bar" story. However, two notes of caution are in order.
First, as already noted, PRC found that the perceived "tort effect" was actually a party effect: rulings against preemption are substantially more likely in cases to which a state is a party, and that is generally not the case in tort cases. We have performed the same analysis for the Roberts Court and found the earlier result confirmed.
Second, the raw case count masks the path-dependent dynamic of tort preemption litigation over time. A finding for preemption in a tort case (1) does not necessarily settle the scope of preemption under a given statutory provision; it may merely invite the plaintiffs' bar to plead substantially the same claims on slightly different, often novel and made-for-preemption-evasion theories in cases (2), (3), and (4). 41 To make preemption "stick" in such situations, the defense bar must win all of its cases; to defeat it, the plaintiffs' bar need win only once. By the same token, a pro-preemption ruling in cases (2) and (3) need not signal unremitting judicial hostility to plaintiffs' lawyers; it may merely mean that the justices are policing an earlier ruling against evasion and circumvention. We cannot think of a way to capture the dynamic in numbers. It is nonetheless real, and it counsels caution in interpreting the statistical results.
III. Preemption Litigation: A Partial Anatomy
PRC examined the pattern of preemption litigation in the Supreme Court with respect to party constellations and the provenance of cases in state or federal court. We here report our updated findings, along with comments on noteworthy developments and several wrong guesses on our part.
A. Party Constellations.
Preemption disputes (among business, other private actors, states, and the federal government) arise-and arrive at the Supreme Court-in many configurations. ERISA cases may pit business litigants or private parties against each other; immigration cases may involve the federal government directly. However, two party constellations predominate both in the original plaintiff-defendant setup and in the petitioner-respondent configuration in which cases arrive at the court: business versus state governments, and private parties versus business (collectively, "non-government parties.") Table 8 shows the distribution for plaintiffs and defendants; Table 9 , for petitioners and respondents. Because the pattern has remained fairly constant over time, we do not show the distribution for the three Courts. Total  Business  7  37  23  0  67  Private  12  9  5  1  27  State  17  13  3  5  38  Federal  0  0  3  0  3  Total  36  59  34  6  135 As shown (Table 8) , there were 44 private lawsuits against business and 38 business lawsuits against states. Together, these cases account for 61 percent of the case universe. And as shown in Table 9 , 49 (37 plus 12) cases featured business and private parties as petitioners and respondents in the Supreme Court, while 40 cases (23 plus 17) pitted business against states as petitioners or respondents. Cases in these two configurations account for two-thirds of all preemption cases.
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Do some classes of petitioners do better than others? The short answer is "no." Table 10 shows the parties' "unexpected success ratio." Roughly, petitioners prevail in 59% of preemption cases (as they do in all cases). The Table shows how much better or worse each group of petitioners did against other groups. The differences translate into no more than one or two "extra" cases won or lost for any given constellation over the entire period, and they are far too small to be meaningful. In an essentially atomistic litigation market (where no group of petitioners is capable of policing the flow of certiorari petitions), that is the expected result. 
In another respect, however, the party constellation matters quite a bit. As shown in Table 11 , pro-preemption outcomes are much more likely-or rather, used to be more likely-in cases (21) 70% (14) 75% (12) 48% (69) 47% (58) Non-Government 57% (27) 57% (27) 67% (24) 67% (24) 71% (14) 71% (14) 64% (65) 64% (65) 42 The two configurations appear yet more paradigmatic when one backs out, in addition to atypical cases involving the federal government and state-versus-state cases, the far larger number of cases arising under ERISA and the Federal Arbitration Act, which account for the vast majority of the non-conforming cases.
43 Table 11 excludes cases to which the federal government was a party and cases among state actors.
without state participation than in cases to which a state is a party. PRC noted the pattern for the FRC and the SRC and tentatively attributed it to a signaling effect: in preemption cases of any constellation (excluding cases to which the federal government is a party), a state party's position against preemption is bound to be the only non-strategic "federalism" position the justices will encounter. However, the state-party effect seems to have disappeared under the Roberts Court. Regression analysis confirms that impression.
We attribute this phenomenon, not to any grand judicial re-thinking of the role of states in the federal system or in preemption litigation but simply to the peculiar mix of preemption cases decided by the Roberts Court. Three of them were immigration cases (involving a single state, Arizona-which lost on virtually all counts). In those cases, the state party "signal" carries different connotations than it does in ordinary commercial cases. Three additional cases arose over an expansive express preemption provision governing transportation regulation; states lost all three by a unanimous vote. 44 Given the small case universe, those cases are bound to affect the overall picture.
States as a group have an alternative means of communicating their position to the Supreme Court: amicus briefs. PRC documented the states' extensive amicus participation in preemption cases; Finally, we explored possible interdependencies between party constellation, lower-court venue, and case type (tort versus regulatory). As shown earlier in Table 8 , roughly three-quarters of preemption cases conform to one of two scenarios:
• Business or other private parties, confronted with an arguably preempted state regulation, sue the state or its officers on preemption grounds.
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• A private party sues a business firm under state common or statutory law.
Preemption challenges to state regulations may be brought in federal court, 52 and it stands to reason that business plaintiffs will usually seek to avail themselves of that perceived advantage. Private tort plaintiffs against business, on the other hand, will generally prefer to litigate in state court. And except for diversity cases (which may be removed to federal court), the cases will remain in state court. 53 Hence, we expected that cases arriving at the Supreme Court from lower federal courts would tend to implicate state laws and regulations, while cases arriving from state courts would be disproportionately tort cases. That expectation, too, proved erroneous: 
IV. The Solicitor General and the Court
PRC examined the merits submission by the OSG in preemption cases. We found that the OSG participated in over 70 percent of all preemption cases. In over 80 percent of those cases, the Supreme Court agreed with the OSG's position on the merits. The high level of agreement does not show that the OSG's position has any independent effect on case outcomes. The OSG prides itself on its role as a "Tenth Justice," and its enviable batting average may simply reflect its ability to anticipate the Court's disposition.
It did appear, however, that the OSG's submission against federal preemption had a substantial and significant effect, in the expected direction. Moreover, the OSG's partisan affiliation appeared to have an independent effect: we found no case in which the Supreme Court failed to follow a Republican OSG's recommendation against preemption. The justices may treat such submissions as a "signal"-as an admission against (pro-business) interest, and therefore as almost certainly the best view of the law.
As shown in Tables 16 and 17 , the new data confirm our earlier results. 54 The percentages do not differ substantially. Table 16 shows that the OSG has participated in almost 80 percent (96 of 123) of the cases in the universe. Republican OSGs are more likely to abstain in cases between private and business parties. One plausible explanation is that such cases might compel the OSG to take a position against preemption; for a Republican OSG, abstention may be the preferable course of action. (The unusually low number of actual Republican OSG submissions against preemption in those types of cases supports this hypothesis.) As one would expect, Republican OSGs are more likely to favor preemption than are Democratic OSGs (49% to 39%). Table 17 shows the conditional probabilities of pro-preemption outcomes depending on the OSG's position and party affiliation. The differences are larger and more meaningful on the antipreemption side. Pro-preemption outcomes are unlikely when the OSG argues against preemption; when a Republican OSG takes that position, the Court has consistently done so as well.55 The unusually high number of pro-preemption outcomes in cases where a Democratic OSG argues for preemption (83%) suggests that such submissions, too, may have a signaling effect, in the opposite direction; however, this is not statistically significant. 54 Cases involving the federal government as a party and cases between states are omitted from both Tables. 55 These results are significant at a 1% level. The OSG's outsized influence is confirmed by a more formal regression analysis of the likelihood that the Court holds for preemption. 56 The results are shown in Tables 18(a), (b). All else equal, when the OSG argues against preemption, the likelihood of a pro-preemption outcome drops by almost 50 percent and this effect is statistically significant. The presence of a state party has no statistically significant effect (and even the point estimate of the effect is much smaller than the OSG effect), nor does the existence of mass state amicus briefs (where the point estimate is almost zero).
57 As in our earlier study, when we restrict the sample to contested cases, the OSG effect is significantly reduced. In fact, it is no longer statistically significant owing to the much smaller point estimate, not merely due to a drop in power arising from the smaller number of observations. Interestingly, the presence of a state party in a contested case becomes a more important (and statistically significant) negative signal, with the Court being 34 percent less likely to hold for preemption in such contested cases. 56 We omit any case where the federal government is a party to the litigation or where the litigation is a dispute between two state parties, though this does not matter substantively for the results that follow. We eliminate the state versus state cases since the hypothesized state signals would be meaningless in this context. Eliminating the cases where the federal government is a party makes sense given our interest in the OSG position as a signal. The outsized role of the OSG will surprise neither professional Court watchers nor lawyers who practice in these venues. It may bear on the simmering debate over the Court's "pro-business" orientation. At least one scholar has noted that pro-business decisions may have more to do with the Solicitor General's central role than with any judicial bias towards business as a constituency. 58 To the extent that preemption cases are typical of "business cases" in general, our data and analysis tend to support that proposition.
V. Preemption on the Roberts Court
As noted above, the Roberts Court has proven more hospitable to preemption claims-when measured by raw case outcomes-than either of the Rehnquist Courts. Moreover, preemption cases have proven far more contentious and generated an unusually large proportion of divided votes. This Part examines the Roberts Court more closely. To state two key findings upfront:
First, bloc voting in preemption cases has increased very substantially on the Roberts Court. However, the liberal bloc is far more stable than the conservative bloc. And while Justice Kennedy is a "swing vote" in the sense that a pro-preemption majority requires his vote, the evidence suggests that just about every conservative justice may "defect" in one case or another.
Second, the widely held impression of a distinctly "pro-business," pro-preemption Roberts Court is correct-but only up to a point and for (we believe) under-appreciated reasons. As already suggested and as shown in Table 3 , the Court's pro-preemption record is in large measure a result of an abnormally high proportion of unanimous decisions in favor of preemption. Put differently, it is not primarily the product of a cohesive conservative bloc.
Section A. provides a brief overview of the Roberts Court's preemption decisions. Section B. provides an analysis of the Justices' votes.
common law of unconscionability, was decided in favor of preemption by a sharply divided Court, split along conservative-liberal lines.
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• Three cases were decided under the FAAAA (not a keyboard malfunction: at issue is the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994). The cases merit mention as more than preemption trivia because, taken together, they affect the statistics. They arise under an express preemption provision; concern the preemption of state statutory rather than tort law; and were consistently decided in favor of preemption by a unanimous Court. 70 The Roberts Court's pro-preemption record is partly a result of these humdrum, uncontroversial cases.
B. How the Justices Vote
As mentioned, a principal feature of preemption decisions on the Roberts Court is a hardening of positions on both sides. A simple measure is the individual justices' "distance" from the average of the Court as a whole. Table 19 shows the results for the sitting justices, ordered by likelihood of voting for preemption in contested cases: The raw numbers disguise a somewhat messy, unstable voting pattern. Table 20 shows the sitting justices' votes with the majority in the twelve contested cases: Is there a pattern in the churn? Table 21 shows the likelihood of voting "pairs" among the justices for all contested cases. (The upper number for each pair shows the correlation; the lower number, the associated p value.) The Table contains the (to our minds) most noteworthy of our findings, in comparison to the SRC: PRC found that between the FRC and the SRC, pro-and anti-preemption positions hardened on both the conservative and the liberal side. Still, PRC found no voting pairs at the 5% confidence level. It found only eleven observations at the 10% confidence level, six of them bearing a negative sign (meaning a statistically significant likelihood that the paired justices will be found on opposite sides). And where there are no pairs among justices, there can be no voting blocs.
The Roberts Court presents a very different picture. Of the 36 pairs, 16 are significant at the 5% level (the shaded pairings in Table 18 ). 73 Six of those observations bear a positive sign; the remaining ten, a negative sign. The following observations stand out:
• Only Justice Kennedy's votes do not correlate with any other justice's. He alone is likely to be found in the majority in any given case; his vote alone correlates with the Court's.
• On the anti-preemption side, a firm bloc has emerged. Justice Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor will usually vote together; each vote pairing among them is strongly positive and statistically significant. We strongly suspect that Justice Kagan may soon join the coalition; her failure to do so to date is largely a product of a small number of votes.
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• On the conservative side, the picture is more complicated. Of the six possible pairings among the four justices, only three are statistically significant (Scalia/Roberts; Roberts/Thomas; Thomas/Alito). There is a bloc of sorts, then, but it suffers frequent defections.
In our view, the explanation of this somewhat curious picture-bloc voting, coupled with unstable case outcomes and (unlike in, say, equal protection cases) a large number of defections from one of the blocs-must be sought in doctrine, rather than raw ideology. 75 Preemption cases are multi-dimensional and heterogeneous. Preemption may be implied or express, tort or regulatory. Cases may be highly path-dependent (as with ERISA or pharmaceutical cases) or present novel issues under untested statutes. Preemption cases may arise over a wide range of policy arenas, and they intersect with questions of statutory interpretation and deference to agency decisions. These sometimes subordinate but recurrent questions, as well as the justices' strongly held jurisprudential views, shape the contours of preemption litigation. 73 Another six pairs are significant at the 10% level. 74 The emergence of such a bloc matters because it may compensate in some ways for a shift that might otherwise prove highly consequential: with the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens, the anti-preemption camp lost its anchor. 
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VI.
Conclusion
We refrain from drawing any broad or firm conclusions. The universe of cases, and especially the universe of "contested" cases that drive most of the results, is simply too small to instill any great confidence. As we have suggested, a few quirky cases can affect statistical results, and even a handful of such cases over the next two or three terms may produce a very different picture of the Roberts Court. Moreover, a full picture of preemption litigation would have to include here-omitted variables, notably including factors affecting the Court's decisions to grant or deny certiorari. Especially in an otherwise data-free environment, our analysis yields, or so we hope, valuable information. It reveals insights into patterns that might otherwise go unnoticed, and it may help to dispel misconceptions arising from more casual observation or a focus on a few "headline" cases. But the analysis does not provide a basis for any grand theorizing.
All those caveats duly noted, we highlight one finding that frankly surprised us: over time and especially under the Roberts Court, lawyerly preemption questions have assumed a distinctly ideological flavor. Preemption cases are much more likely to be contested than they were in earlier decades. In those cases, once-rare judicial bloc voting has become common and Justice Kennedy has emerged as a true swing vote, akin to his role in "headline" cases over intensely controversial social issues. That departure from the more fluid pattern that prevailed under the Rehnquist Court(s) seems difficult to attribute to the Court's changed composition: as noted, the newly appointed justices' voting record in preemption cases differs little from their predecessors'. Much more likely, it has to do with extra-judicial factors-much more intense resource mobilization (including sharper and better lawyering) on all sides; the failure of Congress to update old statutes even when their judicially divined preemptive effect assumes unexpected and occasionally odd contours; the partial substitution of litigation for federal rulemaking as a principal means of industry regulation; or combination of these and other factors. These questions, while beyond the scope of our analysis, merit further examination.
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Inversely, three cases from PRC went from being coded as non-tort cases to "tort" cases in this article. (2009), presenting substantially the same legal question-as a "preemption" case in the first place is debatable, and it provides a fine illustration of the difficulties that arise in subjecting judicial reasoning and decisions to empirical analysis. As every Federal Courts student knows, the boundaries in this territory are rather fluid. We have sought to address the problem by independently coding cases along dimensions that involve discretionary judgment. Disagreements were resolved in what is best described as a series of mini-FedCourts sessions. Other scholars might well make different calls; and, given the small numbers of cases and especially contested cases, there is no reason to think that our judgment calls and potential errors wash out in the end. We do believe, however, that our judgments are free from any systemic bias. 81 510 U.S. 443 (1993).
82 517 U.S. 735 (1995).
